Naxalism in India: Go, went, Gone…

The Government of India is aggressively working to eliminate Naxalism from India by 31st March 2026, to ensure that no citizen has to lose their life because of it. This is an ambitious target, but the question remains — whether a military solution alone can solve the problem.

“Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants that Naxalism should be eradicated from the country by March 31, 2026 and the CAPF and CRPF, especially its CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) unit, will play an important role in this,” Union Home Minister Amit Shah said while addressing a gathering on the occasion of 86th Foundation Day of the Central Reserve Police Force.

At its zenith, Naxalism was deemed to be India’s “single biggest internal security challenge” by then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh between 2007 and 2010 affecting almost 180 districts across 10 states, including Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, West Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh. Home to around 80 million people, predominantly from tribal communities, this expanse was called the “Red Corridor”.

The Naxalites ran parallel administrations in remote areas, challenging state authority. The Naxalites used mobile phones, encrypted communication apps, and other digital platforms to coordinate their activities and disseminate information. They used social media platforms to spread their ideology, recruit new members, and propagate anti-government propaganda. Naxalites also used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to target security forces and disrupt infrastructure projects, and had a fairly advanced and effective intelligence gathering network to keep track of movements and operations of security forces, often using local informants and surveillance.

The Naxal cadres comprised primarily of tribals and marginalised groups who felt exploited and neglected by the government. They had various front organisations to propagate their ideology and recruit new members. They were motivated by a sense of injustice and a desire for radical change to wage war against the Government of India.

Origins and history of Naxalism in India

Naxalism, also known as the Naxalite–Maoist insurgency inspired by Mao Zedong’s revolutionary strategies, is a movement that has significantly influenced India’s socio-political landscape. It began as a peasant uprising and evolved into a prolonged insurgency, challenging the Indian state’s authority in various regions.

The genesis of Naxalism can be traced back to the Naxalbari uprising in 1967, a village in West Bengal where this movement, led by Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Jangal Santhal, emerged from a faction of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) advocating for a protracted people’s war. Majumdar’s “Historic Eight Documents” became the ideological foundation for the movement, emphasising armed struggle against feudal landlords and the state apparatus. The uprising was a response to systemic issues such as landlessness, exploitation of peasants, and the failure of land reform policies.

The movement gained momentum after the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969. The ideology resonated with various marginalised communities, including tribal populations and landless labourers, leading to its spread across states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, and Chhattisgarh. However, internal disagreements and state repression led to the fragmentation of the movement into multiple factions, each pursuing its interpretation of Maoist principles.

Geographical Stronghold: The Red Corridor

The Red Corridor encompassed regions rich in mineral resources but marked by poverty and underdevelopment. States like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha were particularly affected. The dense forests and rugged terrains provided strategic advantages to the insurgents, facilitating their operations and hindering security forces. Areas such as Dantewada, Bastar, and Gadchiroli became synonymous with Naxalite activities.

In the early 2000s, Naxalism witnessed a resurgence, primarily due to the merger of prominent factions like the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre, culminating in the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004. This consolidation aimed to unify the movement’s efforts and strategies, leading to increased insurgent activities, particularly in the “Red Corridor” regions. The movement’s emphasis on guerrilla warfare, establishment of parallel administrations, and mobilisation of local support posed significant challenges to state authority

Challenges in eliminating Naxalism

While the government has made significant progress in countering Naxalism, eliminating the movement will be a challenging task. Some of the key challenges include:

• Genuine, deep-rooted grievances among tribal communities and marginalised groups, which need to be addressed through inclusive and sustainable development.
• Naxalites operated in dense forests and rugged terrain, making it difficult for security forces to track them down.
• Naxalites enjoyed the support of the local communities, which made it difficult to gather intelligence and conduct operations.

Naxalites – experts in unconventional guerrilla warfare

The Naxalites, also known as Maoists, are experts in sabotage and hit-and-run attacks. They were highly trained, motivated, highly mobile, and flexible and used to gather intelligence and conduct swift ambushes. They used landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDS), and had first-hand knowledge of the caves and hideouts in the dense forests and rugged terrain to attack security forces and catch them off guard. This expertise made them formidable opponents, particularly in the central and eastern states.

The Naxalites soon grew bold and daring to disrupt and attack Indian security forces. Some of their surprise attacks on security personnel include:

• 2010 Dantewada attack: 76 CRPF personnel were killed in an ambush.
• 2009 attacks in Maharashtra: 16 police officers were killed in an ambush.
• 2019 Gadchiroli attack: Maoists torched 27 vehicles belonging to a construction company.

This, led to over 20,000 casualties since 1980, comprising Naxalites, security forces, and civilians. Almost 4,761 Naxalites, 3,105 security personnel, and 12,146 civilians were killed between 1980 and 2015.

Government Response and Counterinsurgency

The Indian government’s response involved a combination of military operations with development initiatives. Operations like “Green Hunt” aimed to dismantle insurgent networks, while schemes focused on infrastructure development, education, and healthcare sought to address the root causes of discontent. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) played a pivotal role in the counterinsurgency efforts and established forward operating bases. This led to a significant reduction in Naxalite activities and influence.

Eventually, there came a stage when the government of India decided to change its strategy and gave free rein to the CRPF to eliminate the Naxalites in December 2024.  The result was that 31 Naxalites were eliminated in a 48-hour operation in Chhattisgarh, and four Naxalites were killed in an encounter with the security forces in January 2025.

On September 6 last year, the NIA conducted raids on premises owned by Naxal leaders at eight locations in Prayagraj, Chandauli, Varanasi, Deoria, and Azamgarh districts of Uttar Pradesh. Several digital devices, including mobile phones, laptops, pen drives, compact discs, and memory cards, were seized, along with SIM cards, Naxal literature, books, pamphlets, pocket diaries, money receipt books, and other incriminating documents.

On April 21, 2025, eight naxals were killed in Bokaro, Jharkhand, by CoBRA. This incident is slated to be the last nail in the coffin of the Naxal menace in the Bokaro region, with vestiges prevailing in the Saranda forests.

Human Stories: Winning hearts and minds

Naxalism has deeply impacted the lives of millions of people, especially in tribal regions.

Alpa Shah’s book, “Nightmarch,” provides insight into the lives of people in Naxalite-affected areas, highlighting the complexities and motivations behind the movement.

In 2024, 787 Naxalites surrendered; this number more than doubled in the first quarter of 2025. These surrenders, facilitated by CRPF’s intelligence and outreach programs, signify a shift towards peace and development.

Current State: Decline and Containment

As of 2025, the influence of Naxalism has considerably waned, with the insurgency’s presence confined to a limited number of districts. The government’s multi-pronged approach, combining security measures with socio-economic development, has been instrumental in this decline. However, challenges persist, including addressing the grievances of marginalised communities, ensuring effective governance, and preventing the re-emergence of insurgent ideologies. Sustainable peace requires continued focus on inclusive development, protection of tribal rights, and responsive governance.

The CRPF’s specialised unit, the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), has been instrumental in counter-insurgency operations. Trained in guerrilla and jungle warfare, CoBRA has conducted numerous successful missions, leading to the neutralisation and surrender of many insurgents.

The Maoists planned to develop a Compact Revolutionary Zone(CRZ) from Tirupati (Andhra Pradesh) to Pashupati Nath (Nepal), called the Red Corridor.

However, the Government came forward with its own undeclared CRZ, i.e. Compact Roadline Zone, to inundate isolated populations in deep jungles. The efforts for a road network initially exhibited resistance from the Maoists, but the CRPF came forward in providing full-throttle assistance to local administration and security to the construction workers, paving the way to reach the remote areas. It is a proven fact that wherever the roads reached, naxalism exhibited a vanishing act.

Similarly, the greyhounds did remarkable work in bringing peace to Andhra Pradesh.

How did Naxalites raise funds, recruit people, train them and set up bases in different states 

Funding:

The Maoist insurgents employed several methods to finance their operation. These included “taxes” on businesses operating in areas under their influence, particularly mining companies, contractors, and transport operators. 

In addition to this, poppy cultivation and the drug trade were another source of income in Jharkhand and Bihar, where opium fields were concealed among legitimate crops.

There were also instances where funds allocated for government schemes were siphoned off by Naxalites, either through coercion or by infiltrating local administrative bodies.

Recruitment:

The Naxalites took great pains to recruit people from marginalised communities, including minors. A document recovered from an encounter site in Bastar revealed that 62% of the 130 new recruits were minors — some nine years old. These children were then trained in guerrilla warfare, weapon handling, and IED-making.

Publicity and propaganda

The Naxalites used front organisations and cultural wings like Chetna Natya Manch to disseminate their ideology and attract new members, especially the youth. In some instances, villagers were compelled to provide recruits under threat of violence or eviction.

Training

Once inducted, the new recruits were trained in guerrilla warfare, insurgent activities, hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, and survival skills in forested terrain. This included training in weapon handling and IEDs for operations against security forces. A significant portion of the training was dedicated to instilling Maoist ideology to ensure commitment to the cause.

Operational Bases and parallel governance

The Naxalites set up bases in remote and forested regions, like Abujhmad in Chhattisgarh, which served as their stronghold due to dense forests and limited government presence. The Naxalites established a parallel government and enforced their own rules and regulations in regions under their control. The local recruits who knew the local language and terrain were useful for both defence and mobility.

Do Naxalites still get similar Support in the villages?

As of 2025, the support that the Naxalites used to receive from villages has diminished. Several factors have contributed to this erosion of support for Naxalites. These include:

• Initiatives like the “Niyad Nellanar” campaign in Chhattisgarh have focused on building roads, providing electricity, establishing ration shops, and improving healthcare facilities in tribal regions.
• These efforts have enhanced the quality of life for villagers, reducing the appeal of Naxalite promises.
• Programs such as the “Elvad Panchayat Abhiyan” offer tangible benefits to villages that declare themselves free from Naxalite influence. These include grants for development projects, improved mobile connectivity, and electrification, motivating communities to distance themselves from insurgents.
• Recruitment of local youth into specialised units like the Bastariya Battalion and District Reserve Guards has not only provided employment opportunities but also fostered a sense of ownership and responsibility towards maintaining peace in their regions.

Residual Challenges

• In some remote areas, villagers fear retribution from Naxalites, leading to reluctance in openly opposing them or cooperating with authorities.

• The rehabilitation of surrendered Naxalites into village communities has sometimes met resistance. For instance, in Bijapur, villagers protested against reintegration of a former Maoist leader.

Why do some Naxalites themselves want to give up the path of guns and violence?

Many Naxalites are increasingly abandoning armed struggle due to a combination of internal disillusionment, intensified security operations, and attractive rehabilitation policies:

• Many Naxalites openly criticise the movement’s leadership and ideological direction. According to the leaders live comfortably while lower-ranking members have to live forests and remote areas without any roads, electricity or taps with clean drinking water. This has led to a feeling of exploitation and a loss of faith in the movement’s principles.

• The Indian government has intensified counterinsurgency efforts, enhanced intelligence gathering, and established forward operating bases, making it difficult for Naxalites to hide and operate. This has contributed to a rise in surrenders.

• Many state governments have introduced comprehensive surrender and rehabilitation policies to encourage Naxalites to abandon violence. Chhattisgarh’s policy guarantees rehabilitation within 120 days, offers a monthly stipend, and provides housing or land to surrendered cadres. These incentives have made reintegration into society a viable option for many.

• Development initiatives in neglected areas have improved living conditions, reducing the appeal of insurgent movements. Some of the root causes of discontent, like infrastructure, education, and healthcare, have been addressed, making it attractive for former insurgents to surrender.

• Many Naxalites are tired of their hit-and-run lifestyle and want to lead a peaceful life with their families. Hardships of guerrilla life, as well as the fear of death or imprisonment, have prompted them to return to normalcy. As a result, many former Naxalites wish to give up the armed struggle in favour of peaceful reintegration into society.

Strategy adopted by the government of India and why it led to positive results

The Government of India used a multi-pronged strategy to combat Naxalism. These included:

• Intensified counter-insurgency operations by specialised units trained in jungle warfare, including the CRPF’s Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), the District Reserve Guard (DRG), formed in 2008 in Chhattisgarh to address left-wing extremism, and the Greyhounds (Andhra Pradesh). 
• The insurgency’s influence has been reduced to 18 districts across seven states as of March 2025.
• Over 400 forward operating bases in Naxal-affected areas, resulting in a more than 70% reduction in violence.
• Integration of drones, satellite imaging, and artificial intelligence has improved surveillance and intelligence gathering.
• Construction of roads, schools, and healthcare facilities in remote areas with priority to address long-standing grievances of neglect.
• Programs like the “Niyad Nellnar” scheme to bring government services to villages within a five-kilometre radius of security camps
• Online payment systems for tendu patta collection and other transactions, reducing the flow of funds to Naxalites.
• Regulations and monitoring to disrupt financial support for insurgent activities.
• Attractive rehabilitation packages offering financial assistance and vocational training to encourage naxalites to surrender and reintegrate into society.
• Recruiting locals into specialised units like the DRG has provided employment opportunities and leveraged local knowledge for more effective operations.

Positive Outcomes

• More than 544  fortified police stations  have been built in the last 10 years
• Casualties among security forces due to Naxalism have declined by 73%, while civilian casualties have decreased by 70%. 
• There has been a significant decline in Naxalite-related incidents, with a 53% reduction in violent incidents and a 70% decrease in deaths of civilians and security forces between 2004 and 2014. 
• The number of districts affected by Naxalite activities has decreased from 96 to 16, indicating a substantial contraction of their operational areas.
• Since January 2024, a total of 237 Naxalites have been neutralised, 812 arrested, and 723 have surrendered in Chhattisgarh 
• Violent incidents in LWE-affected areas dropped by 53%, from 16,463 cases between 2004 and 2014 to 7,700 in the last 10 years

Path Forward: Challenges and Prospects

The goal to eradicate Naxalism by March 2026 is ambitious but attainable, provided sustained efforts continue. Ensuring the rights and development of marginalised communities will be key to preventing the resurgence of such movements.

Conclusion

Naxalism, once a formidable internal threat, has seen a marked decline due to strategic security operations and developmental efforts. Naxalism is a complex issue that cannot be solved solely through military means. While security operations are necessary, it is equally important to address the root causes of the problem and win the hearts and minds of the local people. The Government of India’s ambitious target to eliminate Naxalism by 2026 will require a sustained effort on multiple fronts, including development, social justice, and community engagement. By adopting a comprehensive approach, India can hope to make significant progress in reducing Naxalite violence and promoting peace and prosperity in affected areas.