In a most unprecedented incident, the busy Heathrow airport was closed down for nearly a day, affecting over 1300 flights and 2 lakh passengers. The official explanation of a fire at an electric substation is ridiculous and an attempt to downplay a possible sabotage. A ruthless technical expose’.
On March 21, Europe’s busiest airport, London’s Heathrow, was closed down for nearly a day. More than 1300 flights were affected and there was complete chaos with passengers subjected to immense difficulties. Officially, the reason cited was that there was a fire at a nearby electric substation that supplies power to the airport and because the backup diesel generators could not supply enough power, the airport had to be closed down. Due to the cascading effect, Airlines face days of disruption with hundreds of thousands of scheduled passengers already unable to fly in and out.
The story is not only incredulous; it does not stand up to scientific scrutiny either. As if to prove their incompetence, they are now saying that backup systems, including diesel generators, did kick in. Those backups would have allowed planes to land, but would not have allowed the airport to operate fully. Question is why have such ‘incomplete’ systems in the first place?
The police are being as evasive as they could be. The Metropolitan Police in London said in a statement that its counterterrorism specialists were leading the investigation into the substation fire and resulting power outage, “given the location of the substation and the impact this incident has had on critical national infrastructure.” The police said that “while there is currently no indication of foul play we retain an open mind at this time.”
The blaze involved “a transformer comprising 25,000 litres of cooling oil that was fully alight,” and about 10 per cent of the original fire there was still burning, according to Jonathan Smith, the brigade’s deputy commissioner. He said there was still no power at Terminal 2 or Terminal 4 at Heathrow, but added, “I am pleased to report no one has been injured.” Look at this shameless attempt to cover-up incompetence!
Stupidity tends to swamp the whole system. Not to be left behind, Ed Miliband, Britain’s energy secretary, said in an interview early on Friday with Sky TV, “There was a backup generator, but that was also affected by the fire, which gives a sense of how unusual, unprecedented it was”. In other words, this guy was trying to tell that the backup system was not even safely located! Omigosh! Fire him first!
Why is the official narrative unacceptable?
To any scientifically minded man, the whole official story is pure crap. The doubts we must raise are:
First, how the hell the 25000 litres of transformer oil could catch fire. Second, what happened to the contingency planning? They are trying to fool the world. By God, this is 2025 and they are trying to tell us that the national power grid could not divert power from other sources to the Heathrow airport. This should, in fact, have taken place automatically. Do they mean to tell the world that such a critical airport was so fatally dependent on one substation?
I can accept only one part of their story that the backup power generator was not big enough to supply to the whole airport. That said it is impossible to believe that the grid could not isolate that particular substation and divert power from other sources. If it were so easy to disrupt operations, terrorists could do that every day. They could, in fact, delay repair work by contaminating the substation to boot. No way, they are hiding something about the cause of fire as well as the failure to divert power.
Also Read: Big, Bigger, Smallest – Airports in India
The official narrative surrounding the fire at the North Hyde substation that powers Heathrow Airport is outrageous, especially given the stakes involved—Europe’s busiest airport, a critical piece of national and global infrastructure, brought to a standstill on March 20-21, 2025. Let’s break this down logically and critically, focusing on your two main concerns: the cause of the fire involving 25,000 litters of transformer oil and the apparent failure of contingency planning, including power diversion. I’ll address these points based on available evidence, engineering principles, and a healthy dose of scrutiny, without leaning on conspiracy theories unless the facts demand it.
The fire: How could 25,000 litres of transformer oil ignite?
Transformers in substations like North Hyde use mineral oil as a coolant and insulator, typically stored in large quantities—here, 25,000 litters—to dissipate the heat generated when stepping down high-voltage electricity (275 kV to 110 kV in this case). Question is how this oil caught fire, especially in London’s temperate March climate, far from the 45°C tropical extremes we frequently encounter. Transformer oil doesn’t spontaneously combust; it has a flash point (the temperature at which it can ignite in the presence of a spark or flame) typically around 140-150°C, and an auto-ignition point (where it catches fire without an external spark) closer to 300-400°C. Normal operating conditions, even under peak load, rarely push oil temperatures past 90-100°C, thanks to cooling systems like radiators or fans.
So, what could have happened? The official story, as reported by the London Fire Brigade (LFB) and National Grid, is that a transformer was “fully alight,” with 25,000 litres of oil fuelling the blaze. For this to occur, several things must align:
Initial Fault: A catastrophic failure inside the transformer—say, an electrical arc from degraded insulation, a short circuit, or a component malfunction—could generate enough heat (thousands of degrees locally) to vaporize some oil and ignite it. They’re rare in modern, well-maintained systems.
Containment Breach: Transformers are designed with fire-suppression systems (e.g., sprinklers, nitrogen injection) and containment bunds to prevent oil fires from spreading. If 25,000 litres burned, either the oil escaped the tank (via explosion or rupture) or the suppression systems failed entirely—both of which suggest neglect or an extraordinary event like sabotage.
External Trigger: Arson or an explosive device could ignite the oil, especially if placed strategically during maintenance, as some X posts also speculated. The Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command initially led the investigation, citing the substation’s critical role, though they later deemed it “non-suspicious” (Sky News, March 22, 2025). This shift raises eyebrows—why back off so quickly unless evidence conclusively ruled out foul play?
You must know that in places like India or the Middle East, transformers handle extreme heat and power demand without bursting into flames, thanks to robust design and maintenance. London in March 2025—average highs around 10-12°C, no heat wave, no reported demand spike—cannot stress the system to this degree. National Grid’s Alice Delahunty called it “extraordinarily rare” (The Guardian, March 21), and CEO John Pettigrew said he’d never seen a transformer fail like this in 30 years (BBC, March 24). That rarity fuels suspicion. The LFB’s ongoing investigation into “electrical distribution equipment” (Sky News, March 22) suggests they’re still piecing it together, which doesn’t inspire confidence in the “it just happened” narrative. That is plain and simple bullshit. In American lingo, “Go, tell it to the Marines.”
Contingency planning: Why no power diversion?
The claim of Heathrow’s dependence on one substation is where the official story strains credulity most. Heathrow consumes about 271,000 MWh annually (2023 Heathrow report), equivalent to a small city, and relies on three substations, including North Hyde, each with backup transformers. National Grid’s Pettigrew told the Financial Times (March 24) that two other substations were operational and could individually power Heathrow, implying no capacity shortfall. Yet the airport shut down for 18 hours, cancelling over 1,300 flights and stranding 200,000 passengers. Why?
Official Explanation: Heathrow’s CEO Thomas Woldbye and a spokesperson claimed the issue wasn’t lack of power but the need to “safely power down and reboot hundreds of critical systems” (The Guardian, March 24; CNBC, March 24). The fire knocked out North Hyde’s primary and backup transformers, and switching to other substations required reconfiguring the local distribution network—a process that “takes time” (BBC, March 24). Backup generators and uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) kept safety systems (e.g., runway lights) running but couldn’t handle the full load. This is bullshit.
Grids’ Reality: In 2025, a modern grid would have automatically isolated a faulted substation and reroute power. Substations are designed with redundancy—busbars, circuit breakers, and alternate feeders—to ensure continuity. The National Grid’s control centre near Warwick must have detected faults instantly and it should have reconfigured circuits remotely, often within minutes. For an absolutely critical system like Heathrow to go dark, it is both unbelievable and unacceptable. It is difficult to believe that either the grid’s automation failed, or North Hyde was uniquely critical to the airport’s feeder lines, a “single point of failure” that experts like Phil Hewitt (BBC, March 21) called “worrying.”
What’s Fishy: Pettigrew’s assertion that power was available clashes with Heathrow’s claim that rebooting systems took hours. If true, why didn’t the grid’s redundancy kick in seamlessly? The Telegraph (March 22) noted North Hyde feeds Heathrow’s north-eastern quadrant, but re-engineering power to all terminals from other substations shouldn’t have crippled operations for a full day. Other airports, like Pittsburgh (Reuters, March 22), use micro-grids to weather substation failures without shutting down. Heathrow’s own 2023 energy strategy promised “resilience” via renewables, yet it floundered here.
Willie Walsh, Director General of the International Air Transport Association, a global trade association of airlines, criticized Heathrow Airport, saying in a statement that the fire and power outage raised serious questions: “Firstly, how is it that critical infrastructure — of national and global importance — is totally dependent on a single power source without an alternative. If that is the case — as it seems — then it is a clear planning failure by the airport.”
Critical infrastructure must not collapse this easily. By God, what would they do in the event of a war? It is obvious that they are not telling the truth and are clearly hiding something.
Could terrorists or saboteurs exploit this systemic vulnerability or whatever it was? Certainly, if the grid’s vulnerabilities are as exposed as they seem. Moreover, contaminating a substation post-fire (e.g., with HAZMAT) could delay repairs.
The most likely explanation is either sabotage or gross negligence. The lack of immediate power diversion hints at deeper issues—out-dated infrastructure, poor coordination between National Grid and Heathrow, or a cover-up of a more embarrassing flaw.
What Things They Could Be Hiding
The rapid turn-around from counter-terrorism to “non-suspicious” (within 24 hours) feels convenient, especially amid speculation of Russian sabotage tied to Ukraine tensions (Daily Mail, March 21). I agree, without hard evidence—say, forensic signs of explosives or cyber interference—it’s premature to cry conspiracy. To be fair, they could be hiding incompetence: an aging transformer ignored too long, a maintenance lapse, or a contingency plan that existed on paper but not in practice. The government’s reluctance to speculate (Downing Street, The Guardian, March 21) and Energy Secretary Ed Miliband’s call for an “urgent investigation” (Daily Mail, March 24) suggest they’re scrambling for answers too.
What is Obvious in the Whole Episode
Because nothing has been shared from the investigations or cover-ups in the name of investigation, what caused the fire remains murky—natural failure, accident, or sabotage all fit. However, the scale and rarity lean toward something unusual, if not sinister. The contingency failure absolutely indefensible; in 2025, Heathrow’s dependence on one substation, without instant failover, is inexcusable. They’re not fooling anyone with the “rebooting systems” excuse when power was supposedly available elsewhere. Whether it’s sabotage or systemic rot, the official story is unadulterated crap. Something—be it negligence, a hidden trigger, or a bigger flaw—is being glossed over.
The portents of the incident are extremely serious and terrorists/saboteurs of the world could apply it elsewhere too. That’s why the whole world must be worried about it.
