India’s Constitution is a meticulously crafted document that enshrines the principle of federalism as its bedrock. Power is deliberately divided between the Union and the States to prevent any single authority from dominating the nation’s democratic edifice. The Seventh Schedule clearly delineates this: matters of defence (Entry 1) and the Armed Forces (Entry 2) fall under the Union List, while public order (Entry 1) and police (Entry 2) are squarely in the State List. This separation is not arbitrary; it is the safeguard of a diverse, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural republic where states retain autonomy in internal security while the Centre handles external threats and national emergencies.
Yet, in a quiet but seismic move in early April 2026, the Centre has upended this delicate balance. President Droupadi Murmu has given assent to the Central Armed Police Forces (General Administration) Act, 2026—now notified as law. Marketed as an “umbrella legislation” to streamline recruitment, deputation, promotion, and service conditions across the CAPFs (CRPF, BSF, ITBP, CISF, and SSB), the Act does far more. It reserves top leadership positions exclusively or predominantly for officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) on deputation from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Specifically, 50 per cent of Inspector General-level posts, at least 67 per cent of Additional Director General posts, and all Special Director General and Director General posts are to be filled only through IPS deputation. This overrides a May 2025 Supreme Court directive that sought to progressively reduce IPS dominance and grant Organised Group ‘A’ Service (OGAS) status to CAPF cadre officers.
On the surface, this may appear as administrative reform. In reality, it represents a direct assault on the federal and democratic architecture of the Constitution. To understand why, one must examine the historical and structural role of CAPFs as the crucial bridge between the Centre’s military might and the States’ policing powers.
The Indian Armed Forces, under the Ministry of Defence (MoD), are unambiguously a Central subject. In times of grave internal disturbance—when state machinery collapses or law and order spirals beyond control—the Centre can deploy the Army. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) is the constitutional tool that enables this intervention while preserving federalism. It is invoked sparingly, with parliamentary oversight and judicial review, precisely because it temporarily suspends certain state-level civil liberties to restore order. The military’s deployment is not routine; it is an emergency measure to protect the nation’s unity and democratic continuity.
State police forces, conversely, remain under the elected governments of respective states. This ensures accountability to local elected representatives and prevents the Centre from micromanaging day-to-day law enforcement. Between these two poles—the Army’s hard power and the state police’s local roots—stand the Central Armed Police Forces. Raised primarily for internal security, border management, counter-insurgency, and industrial protection, CAPFs have historically functioned as a balanced intermediary. They operate under the MHA but are deployed in aid of civil authorities at the request of states or in Union Territories. Their command structure was designed to respect both Central oversight and state sensitivities. Each CAPF previously functioned under its own enabling legislation, allowing operational flexibility while maintaining distinct organisational identities.
The new CAPF Act changes this equation dramatically. By creating a single, overarching legal framework that vests ultimate control in the MHA and reserves apex leadership exclusively for IPS officers, it effectively merges the command DNA of CAPFs with that of state police forces. IPS officers, after all, are drawn from the same all-India service pool that mans the top echelons of every state police department. Directors General of Police (DGPs) in states are typically senior IPS officers. Now, the same cadre will dominate both the Central paramilitary forces and state police leadership. The result? A de facto centralised internal security apparatus where the MHA, through a single service pipeline, can influence operations across the country.
Critics of the Act—including retired CAPF personnel who protested at Raj Ghat on Valour Day—argue that this is not mere coordination; it is colonisation. The Supreme Court had recognised the legitimate aspirations of CAPF officers for career progression within their own forces. The 2025 judgment directed the Centre to reduce IPS deputation progressively over two years and conduct a cadre review. The new Act not only disregards this but explicitly empowers the Central government to frame rules “notwithstanding any other law, any judgement or order of any Court.” Such a clause signals executive supremacy over judicial wisdom and legislative intent.
The implications for federalism are profound. Imagine a scenario where a state government, exercising its constitutional right under the State List, pursues policies on public order that the Centre finds inconvenient—be it handling of protests, farmer agitations, or regional insurgencies. With IPS officers controlling both state DGPs and CAPF leadership, the Centre can deploy “its” forces under the guise of assistance while ensuring operational alignment with MHA directives. The delicate balance that prevented misuse of Central forces is eroded. States lose the ability to negotiate deployment terms or retain command oversight. What was once a federal partnership becomes a principal-agent relationship, with states as junior partners.
This centralisation mirrors broader trends but crosses a constitutional red line. The framers of the Constitution, drawing from the Government of India Act 1935 and global federal models, deliberately kept police as a state subject to avoid the pitfalls of a unitary police state. Dr B.R. Ambedkar and the Constituent Assembly envisioned a strong Centre for defence and foreign affairs but a robust States’ sphere for internal governance. The CAPF Act tilts this equilibrium dangerously. It transforms paramilitary forces—meant to supplement, not supplant, state police—into extensions of Central police administration.
Proponents of the Act claim it strengthens “cooperative federalism” by improving coordination between CAPFs and state police. Yet coordination does not require subordinating one to the other. True federal cooperation thrives on mutual respect, not hierarchical absorption. The protests by CAPF veterans and families underscore a deeper malaise: the demoralisation of forces that have sacrificed thousands of lives in anti-Naxal operations, border skirmishes, and disaster response. By freezing promotional avenues for non-IPS officers and imposing a 15-year promotion stagnation in some accounts, the Act risks creating a two-tiered force—loyal to the Centre at the top, resentful at the bottom.
The democratic cost is equally alarming. In a federal democracy, internal security must remain accountable to elected state legislatures. When the same service cadre controls both the hammer (CAPFs) and the anvil (state police), the risk of politicised deployment rises. History offers cautionary tales—from the Emergency of 1975 to instances of misuse of central agencies in recent years. A unified IPS-MHA command chain over paramilitary and state forces concentrates power in ways the Constitution explicitly sought to prevent.
There is still time to course-correct. Parliament must revisit the CAPF (General Administration) Act, 2026, and introduce amendments that safeguard federal principles without compromising operational efficiency. Key proposals include:
1. Capping IPS deputation to lowest level in senior ranks, with mandatory time-bound promotion pathways for CAPF cadre officers to achieve true OGAS status.
2. CAPF Leadership shift to Non IPS cadre to save the India’s Federal Democracy
3. Removing the “notwithstanding” clause that overrides judicial orders, restoring respect for the Supreme Court.
4. Mandating state consultation mechanisms before CAPF deployment and leadership appointments affecting state operations.
5. Preserving the distinct identity of each CAPF through service-specific rules rather than a monolithic MHA framework.
6. Establishing a bipartisan oversight committee in Parliament to review annual CAPF deployments and leadership composition.
Implementing these amendments will not compromise our national security; rather, they will fortify it by rebuilding institutional trust, restoring force morale, and reaffirming the rule of law. As the world’s largest democracy, guided by the longest written constitution in history, India relies on its federal structure as the ultimate guarantor of its unity in diversity. If Parliament fails to amend this Act now, we risk reducing this vibrant republic into a centrally policed state, allowing the foundational promise of cooperative federalism to become a tragic constitutional casualty.
Excellent analysis of how this legislation impacts the federal equilibrium. The article makes a compelling case that security governance in a democracy requires a collaborative approach between the Union and the States. By using the CAPF Act 2026 to cement top-down control and override established service rules, the government is eroding the spirit of ‘cooperative federalism.’ The author is right to warn that such over-centralization of the security apparatus could have long-term implications for the democratic health of our republic.
The author raises an important and quite concerning point about the CAPF Act 2026. The inclusion of a “notwithstanding” clause that seems to shield executive rule-making from judicial oversight sets a worrying precedent for India’s constitutional system. As the article rightly points out, federalism is not just about dividing territory between the Centre and the states—it’s also about maintaining a balance of institutional power. By concentrating command so heavily at the centre and overlooking the Supreme Court’s 2025 directions on cadre reforms, the Act risks turning the CAPFs into a rigid administrative structure instead of preserving them as specialized and relatively autonomous forces, which was their original purpose.
Mr Tarun ji, thanks n congrats for bringing out invisible adverse effects n pitfalls of this bill at the public forum. You have rightly commented, this bill is likely to strangulate well established federal structure of our nation.
Wonderful insight
Excellent 👌 Article explaining all details and intentions of the government to favour IPS lobby and treating CAPFS as second class citizens
Very well researched and elaborated
This is a powerful piece that speaks for the silent majority within our Central Armed Police Forces. The 2026 Act effectively institutionalizes a glass ceiling for cadre officers who spend decades in frontline combat, only to find the highest ranks permanently reserved for IPS officers on deputation. The article rightly argues that this isn’t just an administrative update—it’s an assault on the professional dignity and morale of over ten lakh personnel. You cannot expect high morale in a force where the leadership is disconnected from the life-long experiences of the internal cadre.