From a professional perspective, the Balochistan train hijack was one of the most difficult anti-terrorist operations. Yet, the way the Pak army pulled it off was simply brilliant, making it one of the greatest operations in history. From one soldier to another, it deserves unequivocal appreciation. An in-depth analysis.
The hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan, Pakistan, on March 11, 2025, by the terrorist group Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which demanded a prisoner swap, presented an extraordinarily complex challenge for Pakistani security Forces. The nearly 30-hour long operation to resolve the crisis, which concluded on March 12, involved a meticulous and multi-faceted approach to neutralize 33 armed terrorists—some equipped with suicide vests—while rescuing over 400 passengers trapped in a confined, tunnel-bound train in a remote, mountainous region.
Army spokesperson Ahmed Sharif Chaudhary said soldiers killed 33 of the terrorists, rescued 354 hostages and brought the siege to a close. According to Reuters citing Chaudhary, a final count showed 23 soldiers, three railway employees and five passengers (total 31) had died in the attack and rescue mission.
How the Train Was Hijacked?
The Jaffar Express, traveling from Quetta to Peshawar with approximately 440–500 passengers, was ambushed around 157 km from Quetta, near Tunnel No. 8 between Pehro Kunri and Mushkaf stations in the Bolan district. The BLA terrorists detonated explosives on the tracks to halt the train inside the tunnel, and then opened fire, killing at least 11 people initially, including the train driver. As survivor Arslan Yousaf recalled, “As soon as the explosion happened, armed men stormed the train. They had launchers, guns, and other weapons, and they immediately started firing.”
They took hundreds hostage, with reports indicating they held 214 security personnel and civilians, using them as human shields. The terrorists, spread across the train’s nine coaches, were heavily armed, and some wore explosive vests, complicating any direct assault. The tunnel’s confined space, rugged terrain, and lack of mobile network coverage further isolated the site, making communication and coordination difficult.
Why It Was So Difficult an Operation?
There are basically five reasons why this was one of the most difficult operations in the history of anti-terrorist operations.
Sheer Size of the Target: The first is that a train with say even nine bogies is so huge an object—typically 198 metres long. A huge object makes it very difficult to attack it simultaneously at numerous points. This is fundamentally different from a war-like situation where you might have to attack a target consisting of various fortified positions in depth. There you can afford to attack it sequentially and take the positions one-by-one. Here you do not have that luxury because at every position, terrorists are holding hostages. If you attack sequentially, such an attack cannot remain ‘quiet’ or ‘surreptitious’, that could possibly take them by surprise. In that case, the hostages after the first bogie would be easily killed besides the Forces losing the element of surprise and incurring heavy casualties due to ‘prepared’ terrorists. Then you have to deploy a Force much larger than what you would need elsewhere.
Number of Enemy Fighters: Second, this operation involved fighting with an unknown and large number of enemy fighters. In any anti-terrorist operation, the first thing the Forces want to know is the number of terrorists and their locations. In this operation, they were in the dark about both, making it inherently much more difficult.
Extremely Limited Field of View: Security Forces generally practice on a mock-up of an airliner assuming terrorists are holding hostages there in a hijack situation. Now an aircraft and a train are different beasts’ altogether. An aircraft, howsoever big, has the advantage of being a unitary object. You enter from one end and you have a view of the entire aircraft in one glance. You enter from the centre and you have to have just two glances. A train with sleeper berths makes your visibility and appreciation of the situation extremely difficult. There is no way you can guess what could be there even 10 feet away from you. Moreover, unlike in an aircraft, here the hostile fire could come from above your head also from the upper berths.
Bogies’ Resistance to Bullets: It is extremely difficult to attack a train from outside. The body in this part of the world is typically made of 4mm thick Corten steel, weathering steel known for its resistance to atmospheric corrosion. The 4mm Corten steel provides nearly 4 times greater effective resistance to rifle bullets due to both its higher material strength and doubled thickness compared to the aircraft’s aluminium alloy skin. Even if it is not bulletproof, the velocity of the bullet will be greatly reduced. Moreover, a bogey has numerous windows. These windows act as firing ports for the persons inside. A train bogey thus effectively becomes a fortified DFP (defensive fighting position) with 22 firing ports, or what the Forces in this part of the world would call, a set of 22 ‘morchas’. It meant, it could be attacked only after forcing entry, which was, in any case, a difficult proposition.
No Practice: Special Forces of the world are known to practice on a mock-up of an aircraft. I am not aware of any SF practicing on the mock-up of a train of say 10 bogies. This means that those soldiers who have to fight there have no practice of fighting in a similar situation and they have to improvise tactics on the spot.
How the Operation Was Executed?
Pakistani security Forces, including the military, paramilitary Frontier Corps, and Special Forces including the Special Service Group (SSG) commandos, launched a large-scale, phased operation combining ground assaults, air support, and tactical restraint.
Reconnaissance and Intelligence: The operation began with an assessment of the situation despite limited communication infrastructure. Helicopters were deployed early, as noted by government spokesman Shahid Rind, likely for aerial reconnaissance to map the train’s position within the tunnel and identify terrorist concentrations. Intelligence reports, later cited by the military, suggested the attack was directed by BLA leaders in Afghanistan, indicating real-time monitoring of terrorist communications where possible.
Cordoning of the Area: Security Forces first cordoned off the site in Bolan, as confirmed by District Police head Rana Muhammad Dilawar, to prevent terrorist reinForcements, and secured their own perimeter. This containment was critical in the mountainous terrain, where escape routes into the hills were a serious risk.
Early Rescues: By the night of 11th March, 80–104 hostages, including women and children, were freed—some released by the BLA, others rescued by security Forces. Reports suggest these initial recoveries occurred without direct confrontation, possibly exploiting moments when terrorists separated civilians from security personnel hostages. The rescued passengers walked several hours to safety at Mach railway station, indicating Forces established a safe evacuation corridor.
Tactical Patience: The presence of suicide bombers and hostages as human shields Forced a cautious approach. Junior Interior Minister Talal Chaudhary said terrorists were interspersed among passengers, necessitating precision over haste. This suggests Forces relied on surveillance (possibly via drones or helicopter overwatch) to track terrorist movements and identify opportunities for incremental rescues.
Mobilization of Special Forces: The military deployed hundreds of troops, including elite Special Forces, backed by air support. The involvement of the air Force, as mentioned by Chaudhary, likely included helicopter gunships or drones to provide cover and suppress terrorist fire from elevated positions outside the tunnel.
Helicopter Backup: Helicopters provided not only reconnaissance but also rapid troop insertion and extraction in the rugged terrain, as well as potential fire support to pin down terrorists attempting to flee into the mountains.
Staging the Operation: With 70–80 attackers (as per initial estimates) spread across multiple compartments, Forces likely divided into assault teams, each assigned specific coaches or sections of the train. The tunnel’s narrow confines required a coordinated entry strategy, possibly using multiple access points like windows, doors, or breaches in the train’s structure.
Storming the Train: On 12th March evening, after a day-long standoff, security Forces launched the decisive assault. Military spokesperson Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhary described it as a “prolonged, intense, and daring operation,” suggesting a combination of close-quarters combat and rapid breaching tactics. Special Forces likely used Stun grenades (flashbangs), smoke grenades, or tear gas to disorient terrorists while minimizing harm to hostages.
Neutralizing Suicide Bombers: Most probably, they used distraction tactics to isolate and neutralize them as use of snipers was difficult in the absence of clear lines-of-sight.
Compartment-by-Compartment Clearance: With terrorists dispersed across nine coaches, teams systematically cleared each section. Details of how exactly they fought in each compartment, what resistance was offered by the terrorists and how they minimized Forces’ casualties are not available in public domain.
Medical and Evacuation Teams: Post-assault, a special train organized by the army evacuated the wounded and survivors to Mach railway station, turned into a makeshift hospital. Ambulances and paramedics were on standby, indicating robust logistical planning to handle casualties—37 passengers were injured, per security sources.
The terrorist group Baloch Liberation Army, which claimed responsibility for the attack, later released a statement saying its fighters had escaped with 214 hostages and since had executed all of them, without giving any evidence to back that up. This claim has not found support from any other source in the world. Most probably it is a bluff or a face-saving device. There is no way; the government could hide such huge casualties from the world. The information would have leaked out anyway.
Why was it a model operation?
Adaptation to Terrain: The use of air assets and Special Forces overcame the isolation and ruggedness of Bolan, a challenge many Forces might face in similar remote hostage crises.
Hostage-Centric Tactics: Balancing lethal Force with hostage safety—especially against suicide bombers—required exceptional discipline and real-time decision-making, offering a blueprint for confined-space rescues.
Coordination under Pressure: The seamless integration of ground troops, air support, and logistics in a communication-dead zone highlights the importance of pre-planned contingencies and unit cohesion.
Opportunity for Pakistan
The train hijacking, though dastardly and savage, was a blessing in disguise for the state of Pakistan in general and the Pak army in particular. Citing this as an example, they can now pull all the stops and go whole hog to crush the terrorists as best as they can without bothering much about the allegations of human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings and mysterious disappearances.
Hats Off!
Train hijackings were a staple of the Western genre (the Wild West) films. In ‘Once Upon a Time in the West’ (1968), a train’s tracks were blown up to stop the train, a key plot point in the film’s action sequence. Movies like ‘The Taking of Pelham 123’ (1974) and ‘Unstoppable’ (2010) also featured train hijackings in a modern context. Who could imagine that the reel-life horror would be replicated in real life? And, by God, they chose the terrain too as rugged as in the films.
The operation to retake the Jaffar Express was a master class in overcoming a tactically nightmarish scenario: a fortified, multi-compartment train in a tunnel, defended by heavily armed terrorists with explosives and hostages. It was a ‘seemingly impossible task’. Over 300 hostages were ultimately freed, with 346 cited by an army official to AFP (354 according to minister), reflecting near-total success in a high-stakes scenario with the loss of 23 soldiers while killing all 33 terrorists. While exact details (e.g., specific breaching methods or sniper positions, etc.) remain undisclosed, the broad mechanics reveal a professional, adaptable approach that could indeed serve as a model for security Forces worldwide facing similar high-stakes, confined-space hostage crises. From one soldier to another, I have only admiration for the brilliant operation.
