The Agnipath Scheme unveiled in June 2022, promised a youthful, tech-savvy Indian Armed Forces while easing pension burdens. Recruiting youth as Agniveers for a four-year term, with only 25% retained for longer service, the scheme aimed to modernize the military. Yet, my 2022 Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Delhi High Court (W.P. (C) 11904/2022) warned of its risks: compromised national security, exploitation of youth, and constitutional violations. Dismissed in 2023 as a matter of government policy, the PIL’s concerns have proven prophetic in 2025, as operational inefficiencies, widespread discontent, and stark benefit disparities for deceased Agniveers’ families emerge. This article revisits the PIL’s arguments, substantiates them with current evidence, highlights the human cost through cases of benefit deprivation, and urges reforms to restore equity and military readiness.
The Agnipath Journey: From Promise to Peril
June 14, 2022: The Union Cabinet approved Agnipath, targeting youth aged 17.5–21 for a four-year stint.
June 15–17, 2022: Briefings, age relaxations, and educational support programs launched the scheme.
August 2022: My PIL challenged Agnipath’s arbitrary implementation, alleging violations of Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution and Section 193A of the Army Act, 1950, citing risks to security and socio-economic harm.
2023: The Delhi High Court dismissed the PIL, deferring to government prerogative.
2023–2025: Over 80,000 Agniveers have been inducted, but protests, veteran critiques, and reports of inadequate compensation for deceased Agniveers’ families validate the PIL’s foresight.
The PIL’s Warnings: Validated by 2025 Realities
The PIL’s concerns, dismissed as speculative, are now undeniable, backed by evidence of security risks, inequality, and systemic flaws.
Six-month training and short tenures, rolled out without pilot testing, undermine military readiness, violating Article 21’s right to life and security.
A 2025 defense audit confirms Agniveers lack advanced combat skills due to abbreviated training, hampering operations in high-stakes regions like Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir.
Border tensions with China (2023–2024 skirmishes) highlight the need for seasoned troops, as seen in the 2020 Galwan clash. Agniveers’ limited readiness falls short.
The Indian Air Force reports a 15% shortfall in skilled technicians for critical assets, as Agniveers receive no trade-specific training (2025 IAF report).
The PIL’s call for extended training and pilot testing is now critical to address these gaps.
Exploitation and Inequality
Lower pay for Agniveers violates Articles 14 and 16 (equality), and the scheme exploits unemployed youth, contravening Article 39(f)’s directive for opportunity.
Agniveers earn ₹25,000 monthly, far below the ₹35,000–₹50,000 for regular soldiers, eroding morale. A 2025 survey shows 60% of Agniveers are dissatisfied with pay.
After four years, 75% of Agniveers are discharged with a ₹11.7 lakh Seva Nidhi package but no job security. In 2025, only 20% secure promised jobs, fuelling protests in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (6–8% unemployment, CMIE 2022–2024).
A 2025 National Skill Development Corporation study finds 70% of former Agniveers struggle to resume academics, facing educational disruption.
Significance: The PIL’s warnings of exploitation resonate in the economic and social precarity faced by discharged Agniveers.
Arbitrary Implementation
Cancelling 2019 recruitment processes was arbitrary, violating Article 16(1)’s equal opportunity.
Inconsistent recruitment criteria in 2024–2025 cycles continue to erode trust, with X posts amplifying candidate grievances. The Babita Puniya (2020) case supports judicial scrutiny of arbitrary policies.
Ongoing distrust validates the PIL’s challenge to retrospective cancellations.
Bypassing Democratic Oversight
Agnipath bypassed Section 193A of the Army Act, requiring parliamentary discussion.
No Army Act amendments have formalized Agniveer ranks after three years, drawing criticism from a 2025 parliamentary committee report.
The PIL’s emphasis on democratic process is now a pressing concern.
Internal Security and Cohesion Risks
Discharged, trained Agniveers without jobs could pose internal security risks, and short tenures weaken unit cohesion.
Reports of former Agniveers engaging in arms-related crimes in Jharkhand (2025) highlight rehabilitation failures. A 2025 defense study notes a 25% decline in unit cohesion.
The PIL’s foresight on these risks demands urgent attention.
Misguided Global Comparisons
Comparisons with 36 countries ignore India’s unique security challenges.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict exposes conscripted forces’ limitations, reinforcing the need for professional soldiers in India’s context, as seen in 2024 Arunachal operations.
The PIL’s rejection of global models is validated.
The Human Cost: Benefit Disparities for Deceased Agniveers
The PIL’s warning of inadequate post-death benefits is starkly evident in cases where Agniveers’ families are denied pensions, gratuity, and lifelong medical benefits—standard for regular soldiers. These disparities have sparked public and parliamentary outcry. Key cases include:
Agniveer Gawate Akshay Laxman (October 2023, Siachen Glacier)
Incident: Died from medical complications due to high-altitude conditions, the first Agniveer casualty in the line of duty.
Benefits Provided: ₹1.1 crore, including ₹48 lakh insurance, ₹44 lakh ex-gratia, ₹8 lakh from the Armed Forces Battle Casualty Fund, and ₹10 lakh from the Maharashtra government.
Deprivations: No pension or lifelong medical benefits. A pending application for “battle casualty” status for an additional ₹1 crore highlights delays. The family’s demand for a pension, unavailable under Agnipath, remains unmet.
Impact: Veterans like Navdeep Singh note that regular soldiers’ families receive pensions even for non-duty deaths, fueling debates on inequity.
Agniveer Ajay Kumar (January 2024, Rajouri, Jammu & Kashmir)
Incident: Killed in a landmine blast near the Line of Control.
Benefits Provided: ₹98.39 lakh, with an additional ₹67 lakh (ex-gratia, welfare fund, pay balance, Seva Nidhi) pending verification, totaling ₹1.65 crore.
Deprivations: No pension, gratuity, or canteen card. The family disputed the “compensation” label, noting ₹50 lakh was bank insurance, and demanded martyr status and pension benefits.
Impact: Public confusion, amplified by Rahul Gandhi’s refuted non-payment claims, underscores dissatisfaction with Agnipath’s benefit structure.
Agniveer Amritpal Singh (October 2023, Rajouri, J&K)
Incident: Died by suicide via self-inflicted gunshot on sentry duty, classified as non-duty.
Benefits Provided: Limited to ₹2–3 lakh Seva Nidhi and ₹48 lakh insurance, as the death was not attributed to military service.
Deprivations: No ex-gratia, battle casualty funds, military funeral, or guard of honor. The absence of pension or medical benefits drew criticism from AAP’s Raghav Chadha and Punjab CM Bhagwant Mann, who provided ₹1 crore state compensation.
Impact: The lack of honors cemented perceptions of Agniveers as “second-class” soldiers, validating the PIL’s equality concerns.
Reported Agniveer Deaths (2022–2025)
Approximately 20 Agniveer deaths have been reported, primarily in the Army, with one in the Air Force:
Amritpal Singh (October 2023, Rajouri): Suicide.
Gawate Akshay Laxman (October 2023, Siachen): Medical complications.
Ajay Kumar (January 2024, Rajouri): Landmine blast.
Srikant Kumar Chaudhary (2024, Agra, IAF): Suicide.
16 additional Army cases (2023–2024): Accidents, operations, or suicides, per New Indian Express reports. Note: Underreporting obscures precise figures. Families typically received ₹1–1.65 crore lump sums but were denied pensions and other regular soldier benefits.
Constitutional and Legal Imperatives
The PIL’s invocation of constitutional principles remains compelling:
Article 21: Security risks and inadequate benefits violate the right to life and liberty.
Articles 14 and 16: Pay and benefit disparities infringe on equality, as seen in cases like Ajay Kumar’s.
Article 19: Restrictions on Agniveers’ opportunities post-service limit freedom of occupation.
PIL Maintainability: Youth suicides, protests (2022–2025), and benefit disputes justify public interest review under S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981).
The PIL’s dismissal overlooked these violations, now undeniable in 2025.
Voices of Validation
Lt. Gen. Vinod Bhatia (2025) and Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur (2024) advocate pilot testing and equal benefits, echoing the PIL.
X posts decry Agnipath’s lack of pensions and martyr status, with #ReformAgnipath trending.
A 2024 report recommends equal benefits for Agniveers’ families, aligning with the PIL’s call for equity.
A Roadmap for Reform
The PIL’s recommendations, now validated, offer a path forward:
Implement Agnipath in select units to evaluate training and cohesion.
Amend the Army Act under Section 193A for legislative scrutiny.
Increase training to one year, including trade-specific modules.
Grant pensions, gratuity, and medical benefits to Agniveers’ families, as urged by the 2024 parliamentary committee.
Mandate job reservations and educational support for discharged Agniveers.
Extend service to six years to enhance experience and cohesion.
Publish comprehensive data on Agniveer deaths and benefits to address public concerns.
Conclusion
The Agnipath Scheme, once heralded as a bold reform, has revealed its flaws in 2025, validating the warnings of my 2022 PIL. Operational deficiencies, youth exploitation, and benefit disparities—evident in the tragic cases of Gawate Akshay Laxman, Ajay Kumar, and Amritpal Singh—underscore the scheme’s human and strategic costs. With approximately 20 Agniveer deaths highlighting systemic inequities, the government must act on the PIL’s recommendations. By prioritizing extended training, equal benefits, and robust rehabilitation, India can honor the sacrifices of Agniveers, strengthen national security, and build a military framework that is both equitable and effective.
Agniveer scheme is truly one the best way for youth which gave them the opportunity to serve the nation.
It has impaired discipline and knowledge to young boys.
Dear. I respect your sentiments but with your educational background and with this fluent English I don’t think you are trying to join as Agniveer. The connect of this Article will be with those who are affected : Young Commanders, Agniveer and Commanding Officer. You must revisit the Article. God bless you.
Col Amit, you have covered the legal aspects and inferior compenstaion, both after 4 year exit aswell as after incidence of unfortunate death, well. But the real elephant in the room is huge optimisation of the strenghth of Forces by the backdoor, as evident from mathematical models constructed for Agnipath scheme and extremely adverse affect on operational readiness and national security in the years to come.
Jai Hind Sir! Pl allow me to clarify about the point suggested by you, actually I wanted to be aligned solely on the title and also to the facts that in many of my wrote ups , Articles and in interviews I have covered the points which is rightly suggested by you. Point taken for guidance ..regards