The Ram Mandir, in Ayodhya, is the nation’s pride, a living symbol of Bharat’s ‘eternal soul’. It must be protected like our mothers’ honour. We must keep in mind that even a failed or foiled terrorist attack on the temple complex will generate great noise in the Left-Liberal media and communal heat in the country, besides a tremendous psychological impact on the people. The very fact that an attack could be mounted on such a prestigious complex would not only dent the credibility of the state but would also provide an opportunity to those who are bent upon triggering communal riots across the country.
With such disastrous repercussions in mind, the Ram Mandir shall always remain the prime target for terrorists. The nation must therefore be constantly alive to all possible threats and modes of attack, and draw lessons from previous instances. In planning security for the complex, agencies must cater to all these possibilities. Not catering to any one of them will leave a dangerous gap that terrorists can exploit.
In this article, I will discuss only the possible threats to the temple complex because the public must be also made aware of these threats. An informed, ‘aware’ and vigilant public can often discourage potential attackers or spot them before they strike. Countermeasures to these threats are, of course, a confidential matter and can be disclosed only to the security agencies. Terrorists are known for their adaptability, keeping their own and the security forces’ strengths and weaknesses in mind. If we discuss countermeasures in the public domain, terrorists may devise counter-countermeasures from them.
The list of the possible modes of attack discussed below is not exhaustive. Still, it gives a fairly good idea of the extent of threats which this complex faces, particularly given the historical record of the techniques having been employed elsewhere.
Possible Threats and Popular Modes of Attack
Forced Entry, Direct or Fidayeen attack:
This is the simplest method from the point of view of terrorists. In this method, they try to gain entry by firing and throwing grenades at the entrance and the sentries there. The idea is to gain entry into the confusion created by the firing and the grenades with the additional chances of inflicting casualties on the sentries. The chances of failure are rather high depending on the nature of the entrance and the position of the sentries but it remains a popular method. The terrorists hope that even if some of them are killed right there, some could still get through. This technique was used in the Akshardham temple attack (2002); an attack on the Batwara Gate, Army’s 15 Corps HQ, Srinagar (1999); an attack on the Rashtriya Rifles Sector HQ, Khanabal, Anantnag (2000); attack on the Rashtriya Rifles HQ, Beervah, Budgam (2000); Kaluchak massacre and attack on the Army Camp (2002), and attack on the Raghunath temple, Jammu (2002), etc.
In the 2005 attack on the Ram Janm Bhoomi complex/makeshift Ram temple there in broad daylight, five terrorists had banged a jeep against the security cordon, which was followed by the throwing of grenades and firing. One civilian guide died by grenade but the terrorists were engaged by the CRPF and killed.
Entry through Deception, Impersonation or Other Subterfuge:
This is a slightly more advanced technique in which the terrorists try to gain entry through deception, impersonation or some other subterfuge to beat the security. In the attacks on the J&K Assembly (2001) and the Srinagar airport (2001), they used government vehicles and police uniforms to get past police checks. Police uniforms were used in the attacks on the Police Special Operations Group Complex, Srinagar (1999) and Srinagar Police Control Room (2001). In the Parliament attack (2001), they used fake car passes.
Covert Entry:
In this method, terrorists try to sneak into the facility either stealthily or by using false credentials. This technique was used in the attack on the Red Fort in 2000.
Fence Breach:
In this method, entry is gained by breaching the fence using forced-entry tools (such as hand, power, and thermal tools) and explosives. They use the tools to create a man-passable opening in the fence or wall. Firing or explosive is used only when detected. Alternatively, vehicles could be used to ram the fence or the boundary wall. Hamas did this recently to breach Israel’s hi-tech border fence.
Subversion:
This involves taking the help of some authorized personnel who have been subverted to somehow bypass the regular checks.
Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) or Car Bombs:
A favourite technique of terrorists across the world. The vehicle could be stationary or moving. If moving, use is made of the strength of the body of the car and its momentum for crashing through barriers before the explosive takes over. The most notorious case of this type was the attack on the barracks of the US Marines in Beirut (1983), in which they used as much as 12,000 to 18,000 pounds of high explosives in a truck. This technique has been used in the Marriott hotel bombing, in Islamabad, Pakistan (2008); the Marriott hotel bombing, in Indonesia (2003); the Australian embassy, in Indonesia (2004); and the Indian embassy, in Kabul (2008). In India, this technique was used in the attack on the Army’s 15 Corps HQ, Srinagar (2000). A car first tried to ram through the gate and then exploded the IED in it.
When a moving car bomb is used in the suicide mode, then the terrorist has to contend with the possibility of getting shot even before he has the time to command detonate the bomb. To counter this, they have devised several means. The bomb can be given a time delay or a ‘dead man’s switch’. These switches are provided as a backup to the command actuation so that they swing into operation only when command detonation fails or when the engine of the vehicle stops due to bullets or grenades fired on it. The detonation can also be made remotely controlled and the remote can be operated by a man outside the area of operation but in sight of the proceedings. American authorities suspected that this last method was used in the attack on the Marines’ barracks.
In a stationary VBIED, the terrorist covertly parks an explosive-laden car or truck near a facility. He then detonates the explosives either by time delay or remote control. They may try to gain entry if possible or be content just with the psychological and physical impact of the explosion.
The availability of explosives has never been a problem for terrorists in India. We are the second-largest producer of civilian ANFO-based explosives in the world with our annual production a little less than 3 million tons. It is easy for some kilograms or some hundreds of kilograms to be stolen or ‘diverted’ from this huge quantity, the stringent controls on wholesale, retail sale and licensed use notwithstanding.
RPG Fire:
In May 2022, an RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) was fired at the Intelligence HQ at Mohali. In December 2022, another RPG was fired at the Sarhali police station. Given the network of terrorists, there is no reason to believe that a weapon, which has been used recently twice in Punjab cannot be brought to Ayodhya. From the tail of the devices recovered in Punjab, I identified the RPG as the new disposable tube RPG-18. The older RPG-7, which is synonymous with the Taliban, was fired quite often in Kashmir in the 1990s, including at famous targets like the Gupkar Road residence of the Abdullahs and the Hyderpora residence of the in-laws of Ghulam Nabi Azad. The RPG-7 is difficult to conceal because of its size. The use-and-throw RPG-18 is not as powerful (the warhead being only 1.2 kg as compared to 2 kg of RPG-7) but is much more compact and hence concealable. The warhead that self-destructs after a flight of 6 seconds is wasted on a target like a room or a building; it was never designed for that purpose. However, the very fact that an RPG was fired would have great noise value in the media. In India, the Naxals are reported to have unsuccessfully tried fabricating the RPG. Stand-off fire from rifles can also be tried for pure news value.
Improvised Mortar Fire:
From the terrorists’ perspective, the great advantage of stand-off weapons like mortar is that they are non-line-of-sight (NLOS) weapons. This means one could fire them from even inside his courtyard and the high trajectory could take the bomb past other buildings. Mortar fire alone does not help them gain entry, but the nuisance value of the news would still be great.
The Irish Republican Army had used several types of homemade, throwaway mortars to devastating effect against a wide range of targets over the years. The targets of IRA improvised mortar attacks included reinforced police and military compounds, British military facilities outside Northern Ireland, Heathrow airport, and once against the British Prime Minister’s official residence at 10 Downing Street during the Gulf War. Although the IRA fielded up to 17 different mortar variants, the “Mark 10” version which was used against 10 Downing Street, could heave a six-inch shell containing 24 pounds of explosives up to 300 meters.
In India, the Naxals are reported to have toyed with improvised mortar tubes fired improvised bombs, as well as looted factory-made two-inch mortars.
Improvised Rockets:
The most famous of these is the Qassam rocket of Hamas. As you can recall, at 0630 hours on October 7, the Hamas attack on Israel was opened up by the Hamas firing a volley of some 2,500 to 5,000 of their home-made Qassam family small rockets from Gaza city into civilian residential areas of southern Israel within just 20 minutes. This rocket was made first by them in 2001 and since then has been used in large numbers. In the conflict of 2014, they had fired some 8,000 of them. This simple unguided rocket has a sheet iron body and uses a mixture of sugar and potassium nitrate as propellant. It is not even spin-stabilized but has fins for some stabilization. The range of the different models varies from 5 to 20 km and carries explosive warheads from 5 kg to 20 kg. Terrorists could try making similar or smaller devices here too.
Also Read: Dress code in Hindu temples – a necessity?
Drone Attack:
It is reported in the media that Pakistan is using drones regularly for dropping drugs and small arms in Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan. Similar drones could be used for dropping explosives; say from half a kg to a couple of kilograms in a complex or on a building. Indian media had widely reported and believed that in the June 2021 attack on the Jammu airbase, drones were used to drop two IEDs. Once again, the news of any such attack on the Ram Mandir complex would have great disruptive value.
Hostage-Taking:
Any terrorist attack on a crowded place may complicate matters by their taking of hostages. This must always be factored into any security planning. At present, the greatest challenge before the Israeli army in mounting a ground attack on Gaza is the hostages held by Hamas.
No compromises on security
Agreed, a temple exists primarily for its devotees. However, the Ram Mandir is much more than a mere temple. It is the living embodiment of Hindus’ most cherished religious legacy; their relentless struggle of five centuries to reclaim the original place for their Bhagwan; their trials and tribulations; their sacrifices, and the long, bitter but patient and peaceful legal battle they had to wage for it. In that sense, and particularly given its unprecedented grandeur, it assumes significance greater than other temples. The devotees must, therefore, be willing to forego a little convenience to keep this temple safe, and its security must not be compromised for anything.
