It has been 50 years since the unexpected Arab attack on Israel in 1973, which triggered the Yom Kippur War. The Arabs hailed the battle as a success, with Egypt and Syria catching Israel off guard and reaching the Suez Canal. In the Arab world, the victory of the early days is still commemorated. To demonstrate that it can do so 50 years later is a tremendous boost to Hamas’s stature in the Arab world, as well as a challenge to nations and leaders who have made peace with Israel in the last 50 years. Hamas has declared war on Israel, not to make peace with it.
Israelis felt they were unstoppable in the Middle East in 1973, and that they no longer needed to address Egyptian and Syrian concerns. This same arrogance has resurfaced in recent years, despite warnings that the Palestinian situation was unsustainable. Their preconceptions, however, have been blown apart, and they must now confront their current reality.
On October 7, the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas launched a huge offensive on Israel, infiltrating terrorists and kidnapping hostages. At least 100 Israelis were killed, and 1,400 were injured. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proclaimed Israel to be “at war.” Israeli troops replied by murdering 200 people and wounding 1,600 more.
Similar to the 9/11 attacks, current events have had a profound influence on Israelis and Palestinians. Due to its advanced eavesdropping capabilities and the costly wall between Gaza and Israeli towns, Israel has witnessed bloodshed in recent decades. They thought Hamas would be discouraged from mounting a massive offensive, but they are now focusing on a long-term cease-fire with a live-and-let-live agreement. As a result, 19,000 Palestinian labourers enter Israel daily, helping the economy and earning tax income. This institutional failure has had serious consequences for both Israelis and Palestinians.
The huge deceit of Hamas surprised the Israeli intelligence community and Defense Forces, leaving them in awe. Hubris, or the Israeli idea that force could dissuade Hamas, may have exacerbated the situation since it appeared that Israel did not need to solve long-term issues.
It is possible that Hamas opted to strike Israel in response to the Arab world’s acceptance of Israel and Saudi Arabia’s talks about restoring relations. The US is putting pressure on Israel to make concessions to the Palestinian Authority, which is Hamas’s adversary. This allowed Hamas and its Iranian allies to derail the process, which was worrisome to both parties. It is also possible that Hamas and its Iranian patrons work together to embarrass Arab leaders who have made peace with Israel and to demonstrate their potential to destroy Israel militarily.
Israel and Saudi Arabia are now negotiating a peace treaty, with conversations concerning US security assurances for Saudi Arabia. Hamas and Iran most certainly intended to derail the agreement to isolate them, which might harm their chances in the short term. As the Palestinian problem resurfaces, Arab leaders such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may be hesitant to stand up to this resistance, because doing so would force him to stand up and claim his method would help Palestinians more than Hamas’s.
The Israeli government has a defined strategy for dealing with the Hamas struggle, which involves deploying the army, hitting from the air, causing damage to Gaza, and decapitating Hamas leadership. If this fails, a full-scale invasion of Gaza is quite possible.
Two issues arise from Israel’s probable full-scale conflict in highly populated regions. First, worldwide outrage over civilian fatalities may shift blame to the United States and Israel, putting pressure on them to halt. Second, if Israel wins, they would possess Gaza, which raises problems regarding disengagement and who should be excluded. Israelis left Gaza in 2005 and do not intend to return.
Netanyahu, renowned for his wariness, is anticipated to utilize the air force to inflict enough harm on Hamas to compel a cease-fire and negotiate the release of captives. He intends to utilize the United States, Egypt, and Qatar to persuade Hamas to cease, restoring the status quo ante. If this fails, he may examine choices.
There are concerns regarding the effectiveness of Hamas’s next plan owing to fears of Israeli reprisal, a West Bank uprising, Hezbollah strikes, and a Jerusalem insurrection. Hezbollah is the most carefully watched faction, and Hamas is unlikely to back Israeli efforts to restore the status quo. If the Palestinian death toll grows, Hezbollah may enter the conflict with 150,000 rockets, triggering a full-fledged war in Gaza and Lebanon. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the nations that signed the Abraham Accords with Israel are eager to defuse the situation and achieve a cease-fire to retain their relations with Israel.
The current state of political unrest in Israel is a major problem, and the prime minister must find a means to redeem himself via the struggle. He cannot afford to allow far-right extremists to influence what occurs, so he must either control them or remove them. The opposition leader, Yair Lapid, has volunteered to join a narrow emergency administration comprised of Netanyahu’s Likud party, Lapid’s party, and opposition leader Benny Gantz’s party. Netanyahu could utilize this to marginalize radicals, demonstrate accountability, and bring the country together.
